Quantum key distribution allows secure key distribution between remote communication parties. In a quantum network, multiple users are connected by quantum links for key distribution and classical links for encrypted data transmission. When the quantum network structure becomes complicated with a large number of users, it is important to investigate network issues, including security, key management, latency, reliability, scalability, and cost. In this work, we utilize the classical network theory and graph theory to establish a framework for a quantum network, addressing two critical issues, security and key management. First, we design a communication scheme with the highest security level that trusts a minimum number of intermediate nodes. Second, when the quantum key is a limited resource, we design key management and data scheduling schemes to optimize the utility of data transmission. Our results can be directly applied to the current metropolitan and free-space quantum network implementations and can potentially be a standard approach for future quantum network designs.
I. INTRODUCTION
As a principal part of quantum cryptography, quantum key distribution (QKD) allows remote communication parties to share identical and private keys for encryption and decryption [1, 2] , whose information-theoretical security is guaranteed by the fundamental principles of quantum mechanics [3, 4] . The practical implementation of QKD has a booming development since the beginning of this century. For the most popularly applied photon source -highly attenuated weak coherent state light, the decoy state method [5] [6] [7] addresses security issues caused by the information leakage of multi-photon components. Since then, many long-distance QKD experiments have been demonstrated around the world [8] [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] . In the mean time, the measurement-device-independent quantum key distribution (MDI-QKD) protocol has been proposed to address the detection loophole problems [14] , which has been demonstrated both in the lab [15] [16] [17] [18] [19] and in field [20, 21] . Recently, theoretical development on MDI-QKD shows that one can further double the secure communication distance [22, 23] . All these developments suggest that point-to-point QKD over hundreds of kilometers is ready for real-life implementation.
The initial proposal of QKD deals with a two-user communication scenario. In practice, one needs to extend point-to-point links to a network. To this day, there have been a number of experimental demonstrations on the field test of quantum networks. Several testing implementations of quantum networks have been realized in the China, Europe, Japan, and USA [24] [25] [26] [27] [28] . Today, the topological structures of QKD networks have become more complex than the early ones [24, 25, 27] , such as the backbone type structure in 46-node Hefei network, and the star-type structure in MDI-QKD network [29] . key generation capacity of the whole network, and prove that the proposed scheme is optimal in terms of security. In Section III, we construct a flow model for a quantum network and formulate equations to describe inefficiencies in the network. We present our strategy to optimize the network efficiency and describe how this strategy works at the network control and key management layer. Finally, we conclude in Section IV.
II. SECURITY ASSESSMENT
The security in a quantum network lies in two aspects: quantum channel and intermediate nodes. The former has been well studied in the security analysis of QKD; while the latter is a new problem emerging in quantum networks. Trusted nodes can extend communication distances while keeping a relatively high key rate. At a cost, the security of communication can be compromised by the trustworthiness of intermediate relay nodes. In practice, an important issue to address is how to design a key exchange procedure, so that it can tolerate the maximal number of compromised nodes. A related question from the hacking point of view is to figure out the optimal strategy (by cracking into the minimal number of nodes) for Eve to successfully hack the network.
In this section, we first present our network model. Then, we consider several simple strategies and provide the corresponding attack strategies. After that, we propose the strongest attack by taking into account the difficulty of Eve's attack strategy. We find a communication strategy with the highest security level, which is secure unless nodes compromised by Eve cut off the entire communication network.
A. Network model
As its classical counterparts, a quantum network can be modeled by a graph G = (N , L), where N and L are the sets of vertices and edges, respectively. Here a vertex c ∈ N represents a basic unit in a quantum network, which can be a node or even a QKD sub-network whose internal structure is unrelated to the security assessment. An edge in the graph represents a QKD link, which is used to share secure key strings between connected nodes. We focus on the security of nodes and trust the security of QKD links, i.e., assume the QKD process has been completed and secret keys have been generated. For example, in this model, the untrusted measurement site in MDI-QKD is merged into the link as an edge in the graph. We have the following assumptions for the adversary Eve. a) Eve has access to all classical channels. b) Eve has no information about the quantum key of an edge if she does not compromise either of the connected nodes. c) Eve learns everything of the quantum key if she compromises at least one of the connected nodes. An example of a quantum network is shown in Fig. 1 , where Alice and Bob are two communicating parties. There are 5 intermediate nodes between them denoted by c 1 ∼ c 5 , and 9 edges k 1 ∼ k 9 , each representing a quantum channel or quantum key strings generated between the connected nodes. Here, we use the path concept in the graph theory to describe the sequence of nodes used in message transmission. We only consider simple paths here since any loop of the message transmission is useless in a network. Take the red line in Figure 1 as an example. Once Alice and Bob pick a path, all intermediate nodes are fixed: a → c 1 → c 2 → b. There are two means for private communication. One is that Alice and Bob ask all the intermediate nodes (c 1 and c 2 in this example) to announce the parities from the exclusive-or (XOR) operations on the key bit strings with their two neighbours in the path. In the example, c 1 announces k 1 ⊕ k 3 and c 2 announces k 3 ⊕k 6 . Then, Alice and Bob can share a secure key, with which they can communicate privately. Alternatively, Alice can send the message encrypted by the secure key k 1 to her neighbour c 1 , who passes to the next node until reaching Bob. In theory, both ways of private communication are equally secure. In practice, the first method is better because the intermediate nodes do not obtain the message directly. In the following discussions, however, we take the second method for the sake of simplicity. Alice sends a random bit string to Bob, denoted as "messages" in the following discussions, which is later used for other cryptographic tasks between Alice and Bob. Note that in a large network setting, it is impractical to assume all the intermediate nodes to announce the key parities in public for key exchange of end users. In reality, a node will receive an encrypted message from one of its neighbours and a request to convey the massage to another neighbour privately. This situation is very similar to the current internet data transmission, and is the reason why we consider the second communication scenario. Let us begin with a simple case with only one singleline path, which is represented by the red line a → c 1 → c 2 → b in Figure 1 . Alice sends the message to her neighbour relay node encrypted with the quantum key. The message is decrypted and re-encrypted by intermediate nodes and finally received by Bob. This is a strategy that consumes the least amount of keys. In terms of security, this scheme can be weak because once Eve cracked any node on the path, she gets the message.
In order to strengthen the single-path strategy, one can introduce an additional disjoint path, the blue line a → c 3 → c 4 → c 5 → b shown in Figure 1 , to defend the single-point eavesdropping attack. The second path is used to transmit another independent random bit string. The final message is the XOR result of the two strings transmitted via the two paths. The details of the communication scheme is shown in Box 1. 1. Alice holds the message x and generates a random bit string y locally with the same length |x| = |y|.
2. Alice sends the message x⊕y to her neighbor node c 1 and y to c 3 , encrypted by quantum keys.
3. The node c 1 sends x ⊕ y through the red path to c 2 , and eventually to Bob. Similarly, c 3 sends y through the blue path to c 4 , to c 5 , and eventually to Bob.
4. Finally, Bob receives y and x ⊕ y from the two different paths. He obtains the message x by applying an XOR operation,
Suppose Eve can only successfully hack one of the intermediate nodes, she can only learn y or x ⊕ y, and hence the transmission of x is still secure. In fact, if Eve can only hack the nodes in one of the two paths (red or blue), the transmission is secure. Only when Eve can hack nodes from both paths, say c 2 and c 3 , she can eavesdrop the message. Obviously, the two-path scheme is securer than the single-path one in practice.
Generally, we can increase the number of paths to increase the communication security. The two-path scheme shown in Box 1 can be generalized to a multi-path scheme. Sometimes, adding a path may not increase the security. For example, in the aforementioned two-path strategy, if we add the third path, Alice → c 1 → c 4 → c 5 → Bob, the security will not be enhanced since any hacking strategy that can successfully break the security of the two-path scheme will also break this three-path case. In order to design a robust communication scheme against compromised nodes, the crucial question here is to add proper paths. From the hacking point of view, given a communication scheme and a maximal number of nodes she can hack, Eve should choose the nodes to be compromised smartly so that the attack works. Now, we model communication schemes and define the security levels regarding a quantum network formally. Denote M to be the set of paths used in a communication scheme. All the paths goes from Alice to Bob. In data transmission, Alice generates |M| random bit strings, y 1 , y 2 , . . . , y |M| , and sends each through the paths in the set M independently similar to the one described in Box 1. Here, we can see that a path set M corresponds to a communication scheme.
For a graph G = (N , L), denote A ∈ N \ {Alice, Bob} the set of compromised nodes, which uniquely determines Eve's hacking strategy. In the following discussion, we exclude the obvious case where there exists a direct QKD link between Alice and Bob. A Boolean function sec(A, M) of a communication scheme and hacking strategy is defined as follows. 
By definition, we see that a strongest attack should contain at least one node of each possible path between Alice and Bob. When Eve compromises a node, by definition, we assume that she knows all the keys distributed from (and to) this node. From a security point of view, one can think of Eve making those connecting edges insecure. Given an attack A, define L A ⊆ L the set of insecure edges caused by this attack. If Alice and Bob cannot be connected by a path without using any edges in L A , no secure path can be found under this attack and such attack is strongest. Thus, we have the following theorem. Proof. Proof of "if": a cut in the graph theory is a partition of the nodes into two disjoint subsets. It determines a cut-set, the set of edges whose two end nodes belongs to different subsets of the partition. Alice and Bob belongs to different subsets. Hence any path connecting Alice and Bob must have at least one edge that connect two nodes of different subset. From the definition, this edge belongs to the cut-set. That is, any path connecting them must contain at least one edge in the cut-set. Then, no secure communication is possible. The attack is strongest.
Proof of "only if": we need to prove that if L A contains no cut-set, there must be a secure path between Alice and Bob. Consider the set of nodes that have secure paths to Alice, if Bob belongs to this set, the proof is done by finding the secure path. If Bob does not belong to it, this set and its compliment set are two disjoint subsets. This partition is a cut. The cut-set must be contained in L A and hence A is strongest.
From the theorem, we can have the following corollary.
Corollary 1.
If an attack is not strongest, there exists a secure path connecting Alice and Bob.
C. Communication scheme of the highest security level
Now, we want to study the most secure communication scheme. That is, such a scheme can tolerate any attacks that other schemes can tolerate. Denote the set of strongest attacks to be A st .
Definition 3.
A communication scheme, M h , has the highest security level if
Here we propose a scheme M 0 with the highest security level.
Definition 4. In the communication scheme M 0 , each node in the network except Alice and Bob sends the XOR result of all the keys from the neighbor connections to Bob via unencrypted channels (available to Eve).
We take the network in Figure 1 as an example. c 1 will announce k 1 ⊕ k 4 ⊕ k 6 , c 2 will announce k 6 ⊕ k 7 ⊕ k 9 , etc. Of course, Alice's and Bob's positions are symmetric. All the parity information can be sent to Alice. The scheme still works.
Theorem 2. Scheme M 0 , defined in Definition 4, is of the highest security level.
Proof. First, we need to show that this scheme can yield an identical key between Alice and Bob. On Alice's side, she performs the XOR operation to all the keys connected to her and obtains k A . Upon receiving all the parity information from the network, Bob performs XOR operation on all the parity bit string along with his keys connected to his neighbors. Then, all the keys in this network appear in this XOR operation twice except those of the nodes connected directly with Alice. Thus, Bob's XOR result gives k A and all others are canceled out. In the end, they can achieve an identical key.
Then, we show that the generated key is secure for any attacks that are not strongest. If an attack is not strongest, from Corollary 1, we can find a secure path between Alice and Bob. For the scheme M 0 , one can think of k A a secure random key bit string being transmitted from Alice to Bob with one-time pad encryption [45] and being XOR with some extra random bit strings that might known to Eve. Specifically, suppose the secure path is Alice → c 1 → c 2 → · · · → c s → Bob. Then Alice can send her random bit string via this path to Bob. In this case, she adds more unrelated random bit strings, which will not affect the security of the transmission.
Finally, it is obvious that M 0 is insecure under a strongest attack, since it forms a cut between Alice and Bob.
III. UTILITY OPTIMIZATION AND KEY MANAGEMENT
When maximizing the security of the network in the previous section, we essentially assume that the key from QKD is sufficient for encryption. While in a practical quantum network, the amount of key is usually limited since QKD is normally far slower than classical communication. In this section, we consider the scenario where the quantum key is a limited source and there are multiple communication tasks. The problem becomes how to optimize certain network metrics through key management, data scheduling, and routing. For instance, we need to evaluate the encrypted data transmission capacity of a quantum network, i.e., how much data can be transmitted within a unit time. Here, we borrow techniques in a classical energy harvesting network [42] . The main difference is that the key (corresponding to the energy in an energy harvesting network) is defined over channels rather than nodes, which leads to different target functions and constraints in our optimization problem.
Again, we follow the graph theory expression G = (N , L) to represent a quantum network. Specifically, a, b ∈ N represent nodes and l [a,b] represents the link between a and b. The time is discretized in the following discussions and t is the index of the time slot. We summarize the notations in Table I The data transmission capacity problem is a special case of the utility optimization problems. The utility is defined on each data flow, i.e., U The objective of the problem is to optimize the network utility obtained from serving data traffic. Specifically, we consider the following network utility,
where the average type-b data transmission rate at node a is given by
and r is the matrix with elements of r b a . In order to evaluate the data transmission capacity for a quantum network, we need to optimize Eq. (3) with certain dynamics and constraints.
B. Dynamics and constraints in a quantum network
Now, we model the dynamics, shown in Fig. 2 , and the constraints in the network model. First, we have the key storage dynamics,
where the increase of the key volume S [a,c] (t)K [a,c] comes from QKD and the decrease −P [a,c] (t) is caused by key consumption for encryption. Note that in Eq. (5), the key storage should be non-negative,
This key availability constraint, Eq. (6), is a complicated constraint as it couples the key consumption actions across time, i.e., a current P [a,c] (t) decision can affect future actions. Similarly, we have the data transmission dynamics,
The amount of type-b data to be transmitted at node a come from two sources: data flow from other nodes to node a, . The inequality is due to the possibility that neighbor nodes may not have enough data to fulfill the allocated rate. In the following discussions, we just take it as an equality, as when the rate is overallocated, one can just send some dummy data. Finally, we take account of the stability of the network. That is, the data queue backlog of the whole network needs to be convergent with time,
The stability condition makes sure that all packets admitted into the network are eventually delivered.
C. Algorithm design
To solve the utility optimization problem defined in Section III A, we design an algorithm based on the Lyapunov optimization technique [46] , which has found wide applications in different network scenarios [47] [48] [49] . Define the Lyapunov function,
where the storage saturation values θ [a,c] should be chosen carefully in the algorithm as discussed later in this section. Define the following drift-plus-penalty [46] for our algorithm design, so as to optimize utility while ensuring network stability,
where V is a tunable positive constant and
The construction of the target function, Eq. (10), is similar to the Lagrange multiplier method. Then, we choose the control action to minimize the drift-plus-penalty given in Eq. (10) . Using the queueing dynamics in Eqs. (5) and (7), after some algebras, we decouple the key management and data transmission, so that we can optimize them separately. In the end, the target function Eq. (10) can be rewritten as
(12) Here the constant B is given by Before we give the utility optimization algorithm, we need to introduce the following network technical terms. The saturation of the key storage, θ [a,c] , is defined as 
The link weight is given by
which means the maximum possible increase of the data queue in a node in a single time slot, including the maximum endogenous increase d max µ max and exogenous increase R max . We consider a data transmission task by some link l [a,c] to be important only when the data queue difference between two nodes, Q
, is large enough (larger than γ).
The main idea of the algorithm is to optimize the data transmission, R b a (t) (∀a, b ∈ N ), and key management,
, by minimizing the target function, Eq. (12), subject to Eqs. (6) and (7). In Eq. (12) we can see that the optimization of R b a (t) and P [a,c] (t) can be done separately. Note that the network stability constraint Eq. (8) is automatically satisfied under the Lyapunov drift approaches Eq. (11). The total utility Eq. (3) is not optimized directly, but the optimization result can be arbitrarily close to maximum utility of Eq. (3), which will be discussed in details in Sec. III D. Now, we present the main optimization algorithm given in Table II , inspired by the energy-limited scheduling algorithm [42] .
D. Analysis of the algorithm and its performance
Here, we explain how the algorithm works and analyze its performance. We make some remarks on the details of the algorithm. First, the key availability constraint given in Eq. (6) is actually redundant, i.e., we can directly optimize Eq. (18) without any constraint and obtain the same key management action. To prove this, we have the following lemma and leave the proof in Appendix B Lemma 1. The data queue and key storage have the following deterministic bounds, ∀a,
Suppose the optimized key consumption vector obtained by Eq. (18) is P * (t). Then we consider a new key consumption vector P 0 (t) by setting P * [a,c] (t) in P * (t) to be 0, i.e., the only difference between P * (t) and P 0 (t) is the key consumption in the link l [a,c] . If the constraint Eq. (6) is violated, i.e., E [a,c] < P [a,c] , then Second, in steps key management and routing and scheduling, we make an optimization on the destination b, i.e., we only consider the destination b * with the max- Note that this decision minimizes the second term on the right-hand side of Eq. (12).
3. Data transmission. Make a local optimization on the third term of the right-hand side of Eq. (12),
with the constraint of 0 < R b a (t) < Rmax. 4. Key management. Optimize the key consumption over all edges, P (t), by solving the following maximization
subject to the key availability constraint Eq. (6). (5) and (7), respectively. imum link weight, because
Routing and scheduling. Find
Therefore, it is optimal to allocate the full rate over the link l [a,c] to any commodity achieving the maximum positive weight. If there are multiple destinations b * achieving the maximum link weight, we can randomly choose one of them to allocate the full rate.
Third, one can see that the optimized target function in the algorithm is different from the original utility function given in Eq. (3). We want to show that the optimization result of the algorithm can be arbitrary close to the optimal utility U tot , i.e., the performance of the algorithm is given by the following theorem and leave its proof in Appendix C.
Theorem 3. The utility optimization result of the algorithm can be arbitrarily close to the optimal utility U tot ,
where r Finally, compared to the original algorithm given in [42] , we can optimize the key management in Eq. (18) locally for each edge rather than each node. This is a particularly useful feature for practical implementation.
IV. CONCLUSION
Since the QKD techniques have become mature, network issues should be taken into consideration. In this work, we propose solutions to two typical and crucial issues in quantum networks, namely security and key management. We tackle the security issue with graph theory and design a communication scheme of the highest security level, where each node broadcasts the XOR result of all its keys. To optimize the utility of the data transmission, we propose a key management and data scheduling scheme, achieving near optimal data utility while maintaining the stability of a quantum network.
For future works, one can substitute the data communication requests and key rate of an actual quantum network (such as the Hefei 46-node network) and make a field test. One can also consider more complex topological structures and other practical issues such as the latency and scalability. Moreover, it is also interesting to apply other techniques in the graph theory and network techniques in quantum network optimization.
Finally, a trusted node does not need to perform full QKD with users, i.e., the privacy amplification process can be neglected and raw keys can be directly exchanged [50] . We call such a node as an honest but curious node. In this case the security level lies between trusted and untrusted. The security assessment needs more complicated analysis. By the definition of ∆(t) in Eq. (11), we divide ∆(t) into two parts. The first part comes from the data queue term,
(A1) For the first term in the rhs. of Eq. (A1), we want to show that For the second term in the rhs. of Eq. (A1), we have
(A3) Similar calculations can be done for the second part of ∆(t) which comes from the key storage term. Finally we can get Eq. (12) by some algebras. 
From time slot t to t + 1, the maximum possible data queue increase of one node is γ. Then we have Q 
where the first inequality is because the utility function is concave. Then we take a lim inf as τ → ∞ and have lim inf
